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I. INTRODUCTION
Starting in the mid-1980s and continuing, in increasing force, through
the 1990s, scholars began to vocally protest the ways in which highly
questionable "expert testimony" was routinely admitted into evidence in the
courts of the United States.2 Peter Huber3 offered one of the most powerful
arguments that "the kind of expertise regularly accepted as admissible by
courts was, frankly, 'junk' of scandalous lack of dependability. '  To
address the problem of "junk science" in the courtroom, the United States
Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc5 in
1993. In it, the Court set forth a new standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence in the federal courts of the U.S. And,
since the time Daubert was decided, subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court have extended Daubert's application to all expert testimony, not just
that which is technically "scientific." 6 The impact of Daubert, however, is
2. E.g., Richard H. Underwood, "X-Spurt'" Witnesses, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 343 (1995).
3. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (New York,
Basic Books 1991).
4. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty
Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 101 (2000) (citing HUBER, supra note 3).
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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not limited to federal courts, since many states have also adopted the
Daubert test for the admissibility of expert testimony.7
Since the time Daubert was decided, both courts and legal
commentators have voiced concerns that Daubert's focus on empirical
testability, scientific falsifiability, and reliability and validity (including an
assessment of error rates) may pose serious problems for expert testimony in
the behavioral sciences.8 Yet, in spite of the ostensibly daunting problems
facing certain types of psychological expert testimony under Daubert in the
post-Kumho era, courts have continued to admit the testimony of behavioral
scientists in federal trials. In some cases, courts have done so even when the
proffered testimony should have failed the Daubert test, such as in cases
concerning Battered Women's Syndrome evidence and in Rape Trauma
Syndrome evidence. 9 Courts appear to have "embraced both syndromes as a
matter of good social policy, rather than a matter of good social science."' °
While there are numerous articles that have criticized the application of
Daubert to a particular issue, including, just to name a few, topics such as
repressed memories of sexual abuse,1' parental alienation in child custody
cases, 12 psychological factors affecting domestic violence cases, 13 and
clinical assessments of dangerousness, 14 there is a dearth of research on the
systematic application of Daubert to particular disciplines or fields. In an
7. John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility,
57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 901, 911 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Michelle Michelson, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battering and its
Effects after Kumho Tire, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 367, 370 (2001); Dara Loren Steele, Expert Testimony:
Seeking an Appropriate Admissibility Standard for Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions, 48 DUKE L.J. 933 (1999); Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony
After Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867 (1994); James T. Richardson et al., The
Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10 (1995);
Michael H. Graham, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: No Frye, Now What?, 30 CRIM.
L. BULL. 153, 162 (1994); see also, e.g., United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir.
1997); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1298-1300 (8th Cir. 1997); Gier v. Educ.
Serv. Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342, 1344-49 (D. Neb. 1994), aff'd, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995).
9. See Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission of Social Science
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41 (2001).
10. Id. at41.
II. Caia Johnson, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Traumatic Amnesia in the New
Millennium: a New Approach to Exhumed Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 387 (2000).
12. Joan B. Kelly & Janet R. Johnston, The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental
Alienation Syndrome, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 249 (2001).
13. E.g., Hoeffel, supra note 9; Michelson, supra note 8; Erica Beecher-Monas, Domestic
Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the Law of Evidence, 47 LoY. L. REV. 81 (2001).
14. E.g., Monahan, supra note 7; Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of
Dangerousness, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 409 (2001).
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attempt to fill this void, the present study examines how Daubert has been
applied to cases in which psychological expert testimony has been offered in
federal courts since Daubert was decided in 1993.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Background on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
1. The Frye General Acceptance Test
At common law, the Frye test governed the admissibility of scientific
testimony. In Frye v. United States,'5 "the court rejected scientific testimony
based on the use of a lie detector, stating that 'the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs' in order to be
admissible."' 6
The purpose behind the Frye test was to "prevent[] ... the introduction
into evidence of specious and unfounded scientific principles or conclusions
based upon such principles."' 7 At the heart of Frye is the realization that the
expert witness is a hired gun.
"Whatever his credentials, publications, or affiliations, a scientist
who becomes the alter ego of a lawyer is no longer a scientist ...
So while a resume may be a necessary condition of expert
competence, it is never a sufficient one. Science is... defined by a
community, not the individual, still less by a resume. . . . The
cowl does not make a monk."' 8
Despite the uniformity its followers argue the Frye rule provides, it
employs several terms that are open to differing interpretation. Who
comprises the relevant scientific community? After all, "[m]any scientific
techniques do not fall within the domain of a single academic discipline or
professional field."' 9  What is general acceptance? Is it "widespread[,]
prevalent[,] [and] extensive though not universal,"2 or is it agreement "by a
15. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
16. Denise M. Dunleavy, Expert Testimony and the Charge of Junk Science, 451 PLI/LIT. 449,
451-52 (1992).
17. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility Of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1224 (1980) (citations omitted).
18. Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 742-43 (1992).
19. Giannelli, supra note 17, at 1208.
20. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F.Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd 475 F.2d 1280 (D.D. C.
Cir. 1972).
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substantial section of the [relevant] scientific community[?]"'" Perhaps,
however, the biggest problem with the Frye test is "that it often results in
excluding relevant, probative evidence, and thereby impedes the truth-
seeking function of litigation. 22
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence
Given the various problems associated with the Frye rule, it was
intentionally not incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence.23 Instead,
the Federal Rules of Evidence opted for a more liberal approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence. This more liberal approach was adopted
by some thirty-one states as of 1988.24 Federal Rule of Evidence 702
provides, "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise. 25 Rule 703 requires that the facts or data relied upon in the
formulation of an expert opinion be of "a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject., 26 The role of the Frye test after the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence was unclear until 1993 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 7 In Daubert, the Court set a
new standard for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.
3. The Daubert Standard For Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
Daubert involved two children born with serious birth defects. Their
parents brought suit alleging the defects were'caused by Bendectin,® an anti-
nausea drug produced by the predecessor companies to the Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceutical Company in the early 1950s. The drug was approved by the
21. United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
22. N. Kathleen Strickland & Leah S. Elkins, A Current Assessment of Frye in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 446 PLI/LIT. 321, 349-350 (1992) (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236
(3d Cir. 1985)); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH L. REV. 473,
476 (1986).
23. See WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §§ 702.36 - 702.44 (2d ed. 2002).
24. Bert Black, Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 239
SCIENCE 1508, 1512 n.1 (1988).
25. FED. R. EVID. 702.
26. FED. R. EVID. 703.
27. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Food and Drug Administration in 1956 as an anti-nausea drug.28 Physicians
frequently prescribed the drug for treatment of "morning-sickness" in
pregnant women between 1957 and 1983.29 In well over a thousand cases
since its availability in 1956, women have alleged that the combination of
dicyclomine hydrochloride and doxylamine succinate in Bendectin® is
teratogenic, that is, a substance that causes birth defects.30
Merrell-Dow moved for summary judgment of the Daubert case
claiming Bendectin® did not cause birth defects and the plaintiffs would not
be able to proffer evidence to the contrary. 3' To support their motion,
Merrell-Dow introduced an affidavit by a well-credentialed epidemiologist
with an expertise in chemical exposure risk.32  The physician cited 30
published studies on the subject, none of which concluded Bendectin®
caused birth defects.33
The plaintiffs countered with eight well-credentialed experts of their
own who had conducted various studies, all of which demonstrated a causal
link between the product and birth defects.34 The district court granted
Merrell-Dow's motion for summary judgment. 35  Relying on the Frye
standard, it concluded the plaintiffs expert testimony was inadmissible
because it was not "sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the
field to which it belongs." 36 The case was appealed, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment
stating that the reliability of a scientific technique must be "generally
accepted" by the relevant scientific community for it to be admissible. 37 The
Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment of the lower courts and
accepted the plaintiffs argument that the Federal Rules of Evidence
superseded the Frye test.38 The Court made clear that the critical concerns
of Rule 702 are evidentiary reliability and relevancy.39
The essence of the reliability standard lies within the Court's citation to
philosopher of science Karl Popper's statement that "the criterion of the
28. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1191 (1st Cir. 1987).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1194.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1193-95.
35. Id. at 1191.
36. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (quoting
United States v. Kilgus, 571 F. 2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978)).
37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F. 2d, at 1129-1130 (citing Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
38. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-89.
39. Id. at 595.
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scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability.
40
In order to best ensure relevant and reliable testimony and exclude
"unsupported speculation," Daubert establishes a two-pronged test which
requires a district court to determine "whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue.,,41 This "gatekeeping" role calls for
the trial judge to make a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, (i.e.,
whether it is reliable;) and whether that reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts in issue," i.e., whether it is relevant to the issue
involved.42 "Proffered scientific evidence must satisfy both prongs to be
admissible. ' 43
The first decision judges as gatekeepers must determine is whether a
witness is sufficiently qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education" before he will be permitted to give expert testimony."4
This means that a witness must be qualified in the specific subject
for which his testimony is offered. "Just as a lawyer is not by
general education and experience qualified to give an expert opinion
on every subject of the law, so too a scientist or medical doctor is
not presumed to have expert knowledge about every conceivable
scientific principle or disease. '45
The evaluation of an alleged expert's qualification in his or her field is
not a novel concept, and is well within the abilities of our capable federal
judiciary.
Once a judge has decided a witness is qualified to serve as an expert,
Daubert requires the judge to then make an independent assessment to
"ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable." 6 This involves an examination of the methodology
underlying the expert opinion to determine whether it utilizes valid scientific
methods and procedures. Daubert suggests several factors to aid federal
40. Id. at 593 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
41. Id. at 592.
42. Id. at 593.
43. Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529-30 (11 th Cir. 1996).
44. FED. R. EVID. 702.
45. Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 24 (D. Mass. 1995).
46. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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judges in evaluating whether a particular scientific theory or study is
reliable: (1) its empirical testability; (2) whether the theory or study has been
published or subjected to peer review; (3) whether the known or potential
rate of error is acceptable; and (4) whether the method is generally accepted
in the scientific community.47 But these factors are neither exhaustive nor
applicable in every case.48
This gatekeeping role is simply to guard the jury from considering
as proof pure speculation presented in the guise of legitimate
scientifically-based expert opinion. It is not intended to turn judges
into jurors or surrogate scientists. Thus, the gatekeeping
responsibility of the trial courts is not to weigh or choose between
conflicting scientific opinions, or to analyze and study the science in
question in order to reach its own scientific conclusions from the
material in the field. Rather, it is to assure that an expert's opinions
are based on relevant scientific methods, processes, and data, and
not on mere speculation, and that they apply to the facts in issue.49
The Daubert standard was criticized in a variety of fora for a number of
reasons. Even upon remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
[S]omething doesn't become "scientific knowledge" just because
it's uttered by a scientist; nor can an expert's self-serving assertion
that his conclusions were "derived by the scientific method" be
deemed conclusive. . . . As we read the Supreme Court's teaching
in Daubert, therefore, though we are largely untrained in science
and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we
are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those
experts' proposed testimony amounts to "scientific knowledge,"
constitutes "good science," and was "derived by the scientific
method."
The task before us is more daunting still when the dispute concerns
matters at the very cutting edge of scientific research, where fact
meets theory and certainty dissolves into probability. As the record
in this case illustrates, scientists often have vigorous and sincere
disagreements as to what research methodology is proper, what
should be accepted as sufficient proof for the existence of a "fact,"
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994).
49. Joiner, 78 F.3d at 530.
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and whether information derived by a particular method can tell us
anything useful about the subject under study.5
4. Daubert Expanded
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,51 the U.S. Supreme Court made it
clear that a trial court's determination on the admissibility of expert
testimony under Daubert is to be given great deference on appeal.
Admissibility decisions are to be overturned on appeal only if the trial
court's decision was an abuse of discretion. Initially, Daubert applied only
to scientific evidence, but in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,5 3 the Court held
that all expert testimony that involves scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge must meet the Daubert test for admissibility.54
Kumho has been praised by several scholars for numerous reasons, but
two reasons in particular stand out. The first is that the case gives a plain-
text meaning to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 since it does not differentiate
between "scientific," "technical," or "other specialized" knowledge.5 5 The
second and more important reason is that Kumho "eliminated the trial
judge's impossible task of differentiating between scientific and non-
scientific evidence. 56  As Morsek has pointed out, this has particular
applicability to the behavioral sciences:
50. Daubert, 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995).
51. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
52. Id. at 136-37.
53. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
54. 526 U.S. at 141.
55. Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, the Twists, and
the Turns of the Applicability of the "Gatekeeper" Function to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert
Evidence: Kumho's Expansion of Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689, 721-22 (2001); see also C.
WRIGHT & V. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6266, at 285 (1997) ("Nothing in the
language of that Rule suggests that scientific expert testimony should be treated differently from
other expert testimony.").
56. Morsek, supra note 55, at 728 (citing Patricia A. Krebs and Bryan J. De Tray, Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael: A Flexible Approach to Analyzing Expert Testimony Under Daubert, 34 TORT &
INS. L.J. 989, 996 (1999)); see also Michelle Michelson, Recent Development: The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects after Kumho Tire, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 367, 370 & n.13
(2001) (compare, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding
application of Daubert not limited to scientific expert testimony), with Compton v. Subaru of
America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding application of Daubert factors
unwarranted "in cases where expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training")); Diana
K. Sheiness, Out of the Twilight Zone: The Implications ofDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 69 WASH. L. REV. 481, 491 (1994); Timothy B. Dyk and Gregory A. Castanias, Daubert
Doesn't End Debate on Experts, NAT'L L.J. 17, 20 (Aug. 2, 1993) ("[W]ho is a scientist? A political
scientist? A 'human factors expert'?").
Psychology is an example illustrating the difficulty in discerning
between scientific and non-scientific testimony. By its very
definition, psychology is the "science of mind and behavior."
Psychologists conduct experiments and there are standard texts and
accepted methods of analysis which evince that a psychologist's
testimony is grounded in science. However, a psychologist may
also utilize observations and experience to reach conclusions, which
are not necessarily grounded in science. Henceforth, the totality of
the psychologist's testimony should be subject to the rigorous
scrutiny because it would be impossible for a judge to separate the
testimony into scientific and non-scientific segments.57
B. Implications for Behavioral Science
Daubert's adoption of Popper's view of what constitutes "science" is
somewhat problematic for the social sciences in general. Many of the social
sciences "rely predominantly on retrospective observational studies rather
than on controlled experimentation, and do not necessarily meet the...
standard of falsifiability."58 That is not to say, however, that social science
evidence ought to be inadmissible under Daubert. As several scholars have
pointed out, the social sciences have their own standards for assessing
validity and reliability. These standards include, but are not limited to, (1)
replicability, (2) logic, (3) adherence to recognized methodologies, (4)
construct validity (i.e., how well data analysis "fits" into preexisting theory),
(5) adherence to proper statistical sampling and statistical procedures for
data analysis, (6) avoidance of bias, and (7) qualifications of the
researcher. 59
In spite of these criteria, some continue to argue that social science on
the whole should be more rigorously scrutinized under the traditional
Daubert reliability standards using the Popperian notion of "science," and
they warn that courts need to "protect jurors from 'worthless social science
evidence."' 60 If Daubert's focus on reliability was rigorously adhered to -
57. Morsek, supra note 55, at 729-30, n.130 (citations omitted).
58. Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific
Evidence, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 55, 69 (1998).
59. Id. at 70-71 (citing, KARIN D. KNORR-CETINA, THE MANUFACTURE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN
ESSAY ON THE CONSTRUCTIVIST AND CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF SCIENCE 21 (1981); Alvan R.
Feinstein, Scientific Standards in Epidemiologic Studies of the Menace of Daily Life, 242 Sci. 1257,
1259-61 (1988); Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process, 66 B.U.
L. REV. 439, 442 (1986)).
60. HARV. L. REV., Confronting The New Challenges of Scientific Evidence Summary, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1524-25 (1995) (citing David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing
the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1009, 1083-84
(1989)). But cf David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19,
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whether reliability was "defined in its scientific sense to mean consistency of
result or, in the sense the Court appeared to use it, to mean a measure of
accuracy or validity - much behavioral science testimony [would] not fare
well ... .,,61 For example, mental health clinicians "disagree more than half
the time even on major diagnostic categories such as schizophrenia and
organic brain syndrome" and mood disorders.62 Reliability is even lower for
Axis II personality disorders in the clinical setting, with a high of 49% for
antisocial personality disorder to a low of only 1% for schizoid personality
disorder.63
Moreover, even if reliability were high, validity is often low because
"many symptoms - such as whether a person is 'depressed,' 'anxious,' or
'suffering from low self-esteem' - are unverifiable in the same way a
physical fact is because the terms themselves are so amorphous and
subjective. 64  And the problem worsens when not focusing on clinical
diagnosis.
Attempts to explain the causes of behavior (e.g., unconscious
conflicts, chemical imbalances, abuse as a child, relationship with
parents) are even more speculative. Most opinion testimony of this
type is based on untested theories, or theories that have been
subjected only to the most preliminary scientific inquiry. Paul
Meehl's highly critical comment twenty years ago is still true today:
"[M]ost so-called 'theories' in the soft areas of psychology.., are
scientifically unimpressive and technologically worthless." In
many of these situations, forensic clinicians can at best offer only
"anecdata": information obtained through experience in dealing
94-107 (1987).
61. Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case Study, 57
WASH & LEE L. REV. 919, 919 (2000).
62. Id. at 920 (citing Samuel Fennig et al., Comparison of Facility and Research Diagnoses in
First-Admission Psychotic Patients, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1423, 1426 (1994) (showing 57.1%
agreement on schizophrenia); Paul B. Lieberman & Frances M. Baker, The Reliability of Psychiatric
Diagnosis in the Emergency Room, 36 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 291, 292 (1985)
(showing 41% agreement on schizophrenia, 50% agreement on mood disorders, and 37% agreement
on organic brain syndromes)); see also David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology
and Psychiatry, 241 SCIENCE 31 (1988) ("A number of subsequent studies showed that rate of
disagreement of specific diagnostic categories often equals or exceeds rate of agreement.").
63. Slobogin, supra note 61, at 920 n. 11 (citing Graham Mellsop, The Reliability of Axis 11 of
DSM-JII, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1360, 1361 (1982)).
64. Id. at 921.
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with psychological problems, reading about case studies, and
extrapolation from the theoretical speculations of others.65
In light of the aforementioned problems with psychological theories,
methodologies, and diagnostic conclusions, several commentators have
argued that behavioral science testimony should almost always fail the
Daubert test.
66
C. Purpose of the Present Study
Much of the scholarly literature concerning the application of Daubert
has been largely theoretical. In other words, scholarship has focused on
what Daubert should require and how it might affect certain disciplines.67
Little attention has been paid to what the impact of Daubert has actually
been. The present study is an attempt to fill that void in the literature by
conducting a content analysis of all published federal judicial cases applying
Daubert to an issue of psychology or psychiatry since the case was decided
in 1993.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. Data Collection
The research sample for our content analysis was comprised of all
federal judicial opinions decided since Daubert was handed down in 1993
that deal with psychology or psychiatry. This purposeful sample was
accessed by conducting a search using Westlaw,® a proprietary legal
database. Within Westlaw& the following a search was run in the
"ALLFEDS" database:
(DAUBERT /P "MERRELL DOW") /P ("509 U.S. 579"' 113 S. CT.
2786'"'61 U.S.L.W. 4805'"'NO. 92-102") & DATE(AFTER 1992) &
DATE(BEFORE 2001) & PSYCH!
Accordingly, the search was designed to find all federal opinions, both
published and unpublished, citing Daubert, that contained any word having
"psych" as its base (e.g., psychology, psychological, psychologist,
65. Id. at 921-22 (citing Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 461
(1980); Paul E. Meehl, Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow
Progress of Soft Psychology, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1978)).
66. E.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The
"Prestige" Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867 (1996); Graham, supra note 8, at 162 ("[T]he testability or
falsifiability and potential error rate factors for appraising [social science evidence] will rarely be
sufficiently present to meet the Daubert standard.").
67. See supra nn.44, 45, 51.
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psychiatry, psychiatric, etc.) that were decided by the end of the year 2000,
the cut-off date for inclusion in this study. The search yielded a total of 325
judicial opinions.
B. Data Analysis and Coding
Each of the 325 cases was reviewed by three researchers and analyzed
using ethnographic content' analysis. 68  This method is particularly
appropriate since multiple cases were reviewed in an attempt to discover
emergent patterns and differing emphases among and between the cases
reviewed. Consistent with the research method as set forth by Altheide,69
the research involved a focus on narrative data in which both categorical and
unique data were obtained from each case studied. Cases were then
classified based on the patterns that emerged during the analysis.
The qualitative analysis was conducted in three phases. First, 252 cases
in the purposeful sample that did not present a Daubert issue for some aspect
of behavioral science were discarded. For example, cases in which
"psychology" appeared only as part of a person's or institution's title, or the
title of a book, article, or other citation, and therefore presented no issue
under Daubert, were all discarded. Similarly, cases in which the term was
simply mentioned in passing were discarded. For example, there were
seventeen cases that presented issues dealing with the admissibility of
polygraph evidence. Such cases do not present Daubert issues for the
behavioral sciences, but are better classified as cases in the forensic sciences.
The fact that a court may have used the term "psychology" in describing the
unreliability of polygraph tests for determining whether someone is telling
the truth is not the type of case with which this study is concerned. Rather,
we focused on the seventy-three cases in which an issue of behavioral
science was the subject of a Daubert analysis.
In the second phase of the research, qualitative comparisons among and
between the seventy-three relevant cases were conducted. Consistent with
proper ethnographic content analysis methodology, 0 the comparing and
contrasting of cases without predefined content analysis categories allowed
for the emergence of central themes. Cases that presented similar themes in
applying Daubert were grouped together. Ten main themes emerged from
this analysis, allowing for the development of a typology of the way in
68. See DAVID ALTHEIDE, QUALITATIVE MEDIA ANALYSIS (Sage Publishing Co. 1996).
69. Id.
70. Id.
415
which Daubert has been applied to behavioral science. The topologies are
explored in detail in the results and discussion section of this article.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The ethnographic content analysis of the seventy-three relevant cases in
the research sample can be broken down into ten main categories of cases as
presented in Table 1. We will summarize the ten categories found in our
analysis and offer illustrative cases within each category. We will also
compare and contrast those cases within each category in an attempt to
determine what might be responsible for inconsistencies in judicial rulings.
Table 1: Typology of Behavioral Science Issues Under Daubert
Category Number of Cases
Confessions/Interrogations 7
Competency to Stand Trial 2
Emotional Distress 11
Job Placement/Harassment/Discrimination 6
Memory 14
Mental Disorders 15
Mens Rea 4
Sexual Predators 3
Victimology 6
Witness Credibility 4
Miscellaneous I
N 73
A. Confessions/Incriminating Statements (N= 7)
Expert testimony bearing directly on the credibility of witnesses is
rarely admitted. 71 But most courts appear to be receptive to expert testimony
when the credibility of a confession is at issue.72 Specifically, when a
confession is challenged by the defense as having been falsely made, the
courts are willing, even if reluctantly so, to allow the defendant to present
evidence in support of this claim. The key to admissibility of such expert
testimony under Daubert, however, appears to be the particularity with
which the research on false confessions is shown to have specific application
to the defendant. When offering generalized data on false confessions from
71. See Section E, infra at 35-36.
72. United States v. Filler, 2000 WL 123446, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the exclusion of a
forensic psychiatrist's ability to testify that he had falsely confessed to a crime in light of his mental
illness); United States v. Meling, 1998 WL 81450 (9th Cir. 1998).
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social psychological research, for example, the testimony of the expert may
be properly limited to presenting data that false confessions do, in fact, exist,
and the traits associated with those who give false confessions. Such an
expert, however, may not extrapolate from such empirical research that a
particular defendant's mental impairments led to a greater likelihood of
confessing falsely.
73
For example, in United States v. Mazzeo,74 the defendant appealed a
conviction for the misappropriation of postal funds. He claimed that he had
falsely confessed to the crime.75 To bolster his argument, he sought to call a
psychiatrist who had expertise in the area of false confessions.76 The district
court conducted a Daubert hearing and concluded that the expert's
"reasoning and methodology as applied to [the defendant] in particular
lacked scientific validity. 77 The psychiatrist had interviewed the defendant
for only one-hour in person and twenty minutes over the phone. 8 He had
also reviewed the defendant's statement and the notes taken by the postal
inspectors who had interviewed him. 79  Most importantly to the court,
however, the psychiatrist
did not administer to [the defendant] any of the available tests
designed to measure the extent to which a person is likely to make
false confessions. When pressed by the district court to explain
precisely the factors that led him to conclude that [the defendant] fit
within one of the false confession profiles, Dr. Anderson merely
repeated the characteristics associated with the profile and referred
in conclusory fashion to his own professional experience. Assessing
Dr. Anderson's statements at the Daubert hearing as a whole, the
district court did not commit "manifest error" in excluding his
proffered testimony at trial because it was not scientifically reliable
as applied to this case.8°
73. United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1205 (C.D. 11. 1997); cf United States v. Hall, 93
F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).
74. United States v. Mazzeo, 2000 WL 232032 (2d Cir. 2000).
75. Id. at *1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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In contrast, United States v. Raposo8' demonstrates the way in which
such testimony can be welcomed by a court when a proper foundation has
been established. The defendant had confessed to arson.8 2 At trial, the
defendant sought to offer the testimony of a well-qualified clinical
psychologist that he had characteristics that made him more susceptible to
giving a false confession than people in the general population. Specifically,
the psychologist found that the defendant "demonstrated a low-average IQ
with some deficit in overall verbal functioning, attention and concentration
abilities., 83  It was the opinion of the expert that "a lower IQ usually
correlates with a tendency to be more suggestible, less assertive, and less
equipped to resist pressure. 84 Other psychological tests revealed that the
defendant suffered from "depression, poor reality testing, low self-esteem,
and has difficulty coping with interpersonal relationships ... [f]urther, the
tests showed [the defendant] to have a 'self-defeating' personality, which
tends to be isolated, demeaned and/or manipulated by others, and willing to
be taken advantage of."85 The prosecution acknowledged the tests used by
the psychologist were valid and reliable measures regularly used in the
relevant scientific community. 86 The prosecution disputed, however, that the
results of these tests could be interpreted in a manner reflecting on the
likelihood of this particular defendant making a false confession. 87  The
court disagreed and allowed the psychologist to testify that "an individual
with a certain psychological profile could be more susceptible than other
members of the general population to making a false confession, 88 noting
that the psychologist's conclusions were based on the clinical assessment of
the defendant using methodologies that were well-established in clinical
psychology.
United States v. Shay89 similarly demonstrates how the specific
application of clinical psychology to the defendant is permitted under
Daubert in false confessions cases. In Shay, the defense sought to call a
psychiatrist who was prepared to testify that the defendant suffered from
pseudologia fantastica, a factitious disorder also referred to as
Munchausen's Disease.90 The disorder is characterized as an extreme form
of pathological lying.9' Although the district court noted that those
81. 1998 WL 879723 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1998).
82. Id. at *2.
83. Id. at * 3.
84. Id.
85. Id. (internal citations omitted).
86. Id. at *5.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 133-134 (1st Cir. 1995)).
89. United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995).
90. Id. at 129.
91. Id. at 129-30.
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diagnosed with the disorder often show up at police stations and confess to
crimes they did not commit, the court prevented the defense from
introducing expert testimony regarding the disorder, "primarily because the
jury was capable of determining the reliability of [the defendant's]
statements without the testimony. '92  On appeal, this was held to be an
error.
93
B. Competency to Stand Trial (N=2)
Much to our surprise, only two cases in the research sample presented
Daubert issues in the realm of competency to stand trial. Presumably this
remarkably small number is due to the fact that a defendant's competency to
stand trial necessarily relies upon the reports of psychologists or
psychiatrists who have conducted clinical assessments of a criminal
defendant to see if the accused has (1) "a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him" and (2) "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding. 9 4  Accordingly, the determination of a defendant's
competency to stand trial depends on the expertise of behavioral scientists.
In fact, competency assessments are one of the most important roles mental
health professionals play in the criminal process. The usual course of events
is for "clinical evaluators [to] examine the defendant and then submit written
reports to the court. The court then decides the issue, sometimes following a
hearing at which the examiners testify and are subject to cross-
examination." 95 Given this well-accepted process, one would assume that
Daubert is not an issue in most cases in which competency is at issue,
presuming three important factors.
First, the normal processes of clinical evaluation of a defendant whose
competency was questioned must have been adhered to. Second, the
clinician conducting the evaluation must be duly qualified. And third, the
clinician must use tests and methods that are generally accepted in the field
of clinical evaluation.96 When one of these cornerstones of competency
92. Id. at 130 (citing unpublished district court opinion).
93. Id. at 133-34.
94. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). This formulation is followed
in nearly all U.S. jurisdictions and has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court quite recently (in
constitutional terms). See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 452 (1992).
95. Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated
Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 571, 572 n. 1 (1995).
96. United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding the opinions of
defendant's mental health experts were unreliable under Daubert because they relied upon the
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assessment is violated, a Daubert issue may present itself as it did in United
States v. Duhon.97
Duhon involved a twenty-year-old who was mentally retarded. The
defendant had been declared incompetent to stand trial since he had the
mental functioning of a seven-year-old.98 Although it appeared to the court
to be absurd to attempt to restore competency to someone who was mentally
retarded, a condition that cannot be changed, and it also appeared potentially
"harmful to separate from his family a mentally retarded person with the
understanding of a seven-year old in order to attempt to 'restore
competency,' the court concluded it had no discretion to do otherwise"
under applicable federal law.99 After two months in a federal correctional
institute's program to restore competency, the defendant was "certified" to
be competent by the psychiatric staff of the prison.'0 0 The certification was
signed by a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist who opined the
defendant was competent because he "showed the ability to learn, retain, and
relate information inspite [sic] of his limited reading ability" and had "a
general understanding of the adversarial nature of criminal law and an
understanding of the criminal process, procedural protection of his rights,
and the roles of courtroom personnel."' ' Further, the psychologist found
that the defendant held "no fixed irrational beliefs about his attomey. ' 2
The court refused to find the defendant competent based on these conclusory
statements.' 0 3 It noted that independent, court-appointed experts were not
only "unaware of any peer reviews or publications dealing with the
effectiveness of competency restoration groups[,]" but also that the
psychological community generally does not accept them as effective. 1 4
Moreover, the court rejected the methodologies used in conducting the
defendant's competency evaluation while in the correctional institute.'0 5
The FCI's forensic evaluation report cites Duhon's behavior and
responses in the competency restoration group as evidence that he is
competent. However, the report contained no explanation of what
information was presented to Duhon and what he actually
results of PET scans of the defendant's brain while he was on several antipsychotic medications to
determine his incompetency to stand trial, a technique that, even absent the presence of mind-
altering medication, is not reliably established to judge whether someone is malingering).
97. 104 F. Supp. 2d 663 (W.D. La. 2000).
98. Id. at 667.
99. Id. at 668 (citingl8 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1)); see also United States v. Shawar, 865 F.2d 856,
860 (7th Cir. 1989).
100. Duhon, at 668.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 682.83.
104. Id. at 676.
105. Id. at 676-78.
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understood as opposed to what he memorized in rote responses. Dr.
Berger was unable to provide any insight because he had never
attended one of the classes. 106
C. Mens Rea (N=4)
Four cases in the research sample involved attempts by criminal
defendants to introduce testimony of psychological experts to prove the
defendants lacked the mens rea to have committed the crime with which
they were charged. The defendants in three of these four diminished
capacity cases failed. But care should be taken not to conclude that courts
are hostile to expert testimony in diminished capacity based defenses. The
more appropriate conclusion would appear to be that criminal defense
attorneys often try to obfuscate the issues at trial by interjecting irrelevant
claims of diminished mental capacity, and courts appear to be wise to this
ploy. Consider the case of United States v. Pendergraft'0 7 in which the
defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit extortion and mail fraud.
He wanted to use a forensic psychologist to show that he had a "personality
disorder not otherwise specified" that interfered with his capacity to have
committed the crime.10 8 The psychologist's expertise was not in question,
nor were the methods he used to conduct his assessment, as it included a
"comprehensive clinical examination.., lasting in excess of [twelve] hours,
and use of collateral sources to verify the integrity of the information
obtained from the examination and testing" including interviews with the
defendant's wife, codefendant, a police officer who knew the defendant,
"and a review of prior psychiatric records of counseling the defendant
underwent five years previously after he separated from his wife."10 9 But the
court excluded the proffered testimony on the grounds of relevancy. The
psychologist had determined the defendant's personality disorder caused
him "to lack the self reflective mechanisms to control [certain] behaviors."' 0
Such an opinion did not mean, however, "that the [d]efendant lacked the
intent to commit the crimes charged." '' Since the testimony, even if
106. Id. at 677-78.
107. 120 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
108. Id. at 1341.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1344.
111. Id.
accepted by a jury, would not negate mens rea, it was excluded as irrelevant.
Similar results occurred in two of the other diminished capacity cases. 112
United States v. Towns" 3 also involved an inappropriate proffer of
diminished capacity evidence. However, there was a dual-relevancy issue
that made the expert's testimony valuable for something other than directly
disproving mens rea. 14 Towns involved a defendant who was accused of
attempted bank robbery." 5 It was his contention that he did not intend to rob
the bank, but rather was faking an attempted bank robbery because he
needed psychiatric treatment." 6 Because he had been unable to get help
elsewhere for his schizoaffective disorder, the defendant claimed he thought
he could get help through the criminal justice system. 1 7 He sought to offer
the testimony of an unquestionably qualified expert who would have opined
that the defendant did not actually intend to rob the bank, but rather was
motivated to act out an attempted bank robbery to get the help he knew he
needed." 8 The court refused to allow the expert to testify as to intent for the
following reason:
There is no scientific basis to conclude that because [the defendant]
suffered from a combination of schizoaffective disorder, alcohol
dependence, and borderline intellectual functioning, he lacked the
intent to take the money from the bank teller. Put differently, Dr.
Stott has no basis to connect the defendant's psychological
impairments with a lack of intent to take the bank's money.... Dr.
Stott is in no position to testify to the opinion that [the defendant]
lacked the intent to commit bank robbery. To the contrary, Dr.
Stott's proffered testimony is relevant more to the issue of what
might have incited and stimulated Towns to form the intent to
execute a chain of events that might lead to his apprehension...
[rather] than to the actual issue of whether or not [he] intended to
execute those events."19
112. See also United States v. Young, 213 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding the exclusion of
testimony by an expert regarding the defendant's mental state when no specific purpose to cross
state lines in a kidnapping needed to be proven to sustain a federal conviction for said offense);
United States v. Kruckel, 1994 WL 774645 (D.N.J. 1994) (rejecting motion for new trial based upon
exclusion of treating physician's testimony that defendant was an alcoholic, when there was no
evidence that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged acts, and, therefore, his alcoholism
was unrelated to any relevant mental state for the offenses charged).
113. 19 F. Supp. 2d 67 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
114. Id. at 71.
115. Id. at 70.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 71.
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The court, however, did recognize that the psychologist could offer
insights into the defendant's motive, something very much at issue in the
case:
If the jury concludes that Towns was moved to approach the teller,
brandish a butter knife, and pass a threatening note because he
wanted treatment for his mental maladies, and that his desire to fake
a bank robbery to secure treatment did not extend so far as to
include taking the money from the teller, then Towns will have
succeeded in negating the proof of mens rea.120
D. Emotional Distress (N = I1)
Behavioral scientists are often called upon by attorneys as part of claims
for emotional distress. Given that the law recognizes a compensable tort for
both the intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress, it is not
surprising that courts routinely accept the testimony of psychologists and
psychiatrists regarding the types of emotional distress someone may have
suffered. So long as the proffered expert used reliable methods to assess the
victim's emotional distress, courts accept this type of testimony. In fact, of
the eleven cases in the research sample presenting claims for emotional
distress, expert testimony was allowed in all but two of them. And in those
two cases, the experts either used unorthodox methods or went beyond their
expertise.
The first case in which expert testimony was not permitted involved a
claim for hedonic damages - the damages which seek to compensate a
victim for the value of the loss of enjoyment of life allegedly suffered as a
result of a defendant's actions. Although the trend appeared to be leaning
towards the admission of expert testimony on claims for hedonic damages
up until the time Daubert was decided, since the Daubert decision, courts
have generally rejected expert testimony on hedonic damages. 121 While the
bulk of such cases deal with the expert testimony of economists, the same
120. Id. at 72.
121. See, e.g., Kumcz v. Honda North America., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Ayers
v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. I1. 1995); Estate of Sinthasomphone, 878 F. Supp. 147 (E.D.
Wis. 1995); Hein v. Merck & Co., 868 F. Supp. 230 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Sullivan v. United States
Gypsum Co., 862 F. Supp. 317 (D. Kan. 1994); see also Thomas J. Airone, Note, Hedonic Damages
and the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Connecticut After Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 235 (1995); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain
and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83
CAL. L. REV. 773, 811 (1995).
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trend has been applied to the testimony of behavioral scientists as illustrated
by the case of McGuire v. City of Santa Fe.'22
In McGuire, the plaintiff offered the testimony of a psychologist who
had interviewed the plaintiff and then "prepared a report based on 'The Lost
Pleasure of Life Scale,' which estimates the degree of loss that [the plaintiff]
has suffered in four areas of his life: practical functioning;
emotional/psychological functioning; social functioning; and occupational
functioning."'23 Based on that report, an economist calculated a monetary
value for the plaintiff's damages. The report was rejected under this line of
reasoning:
Dr. Murphy's report states the "Lost Pleasure of Life Scale," which
she used to calculate the relevant percentages to be attributed to
Plaintiff's hedonic losses, "has been found to be moderately reliable
and that moderate reliability and validity means that results are
greater than chance." This is hardly a quantifiable error rate and it
hardly seems useful to provide the fact finder with "expert"
testimony on figures that are only touted as more reliable than those
which might be drawn out of a hat. The life experiences of a judge
or jury would also seem to provide a guide to the value of life's
pleasures which is more reliable than random chance and thus such
testimony would seem unlikely to assist the trier of fact.' 24
The other case in which expert testimony with regard to emotional
distress was disallowed was Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.125 The plaintiffs
sought damages for the emotional distress they experienced when the
defendant's chemical plant caught fire and a toxic cloud was released into
the air.' 26 In support of their emotional distress claim, they hired a clinical
psychologist who designed a study to examine the emotional impact of the
mishap. 27 At trial, the court refused to admit the findings from the study,
finding the methodology used in the study did not meet the general standards
of the scientific community. 128  Specifically, the study suffered from a
number of important shortcomings. Some of the tests administered did not
have validity scales which would allow the researchers to determine the
truthfulness of the participants. The literature offered by the expert did not
provide sufficient details to permit the court to perform the necessary
122. 954 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.M. 1996).
123. Id. at 231.
124. Id. at 233.
125. Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 592 (S.D.W. Va. 1998).
126. Id. at 593.
127. Id. at 594.
128. Id. at606.
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"comparative analysis between his work.., and that of his colleagues
elsewhere."' 129  The researcher failed to abide by his own protocol for
conducting the study, thereby failing to control for certain variables. Also,
the potential error rate was too high because of a number of reasons ranging
from participant selection and compensation and using inadequately trained
researchers to poor recording techniques and data coding problems. 30 In
contrast, however, when such methodological flaws are absent, courts
appear willing to accept the testimony of psychological experts with regard
to claims of emotional distress.'
3
'
E. Witness Credibility (N = 4)
Parties often seek to call behavioral science experts to collaterally
impeach the credibility of other witnesses. As a rule, though, "experts may
not opine on credibility [because] [c]redibility is an issue for the jury."'3 2
Klein v. Vanek133 illustrates this point. The plaintiff filed suit for damages
resulting from a battery. 34 It was the defense's position that the plaintiff
was fabricating the story.'3 5  To bolster its position, the defense sought to
call an expert who would have testified that the plaintiff suffered from
bipolar disorder and, generally speaking, that people suffering from bipolar
disorder tend to falsely blame others. 136  The expert would have further
opined that the plaintiffs bipolar disorder caused him to falsely blame the
defendant for his injuries. 3' But the defense did not offer any evidence
129. Id. at 600.
130. Id.
131. See Walker v. Soo Line R. Co., 208 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2000); Skidmore v. Precision Printing
and Pkg., Inc., 188 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1999); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Waddell, 28 F.3d 1215 (6th Cir. 1994); Webb v. Hyman, 861 F. Supp. 1094
(D.D.C. 1994); Bachir v. Transoceanic Cable Ship Co., 2000 WL 1738409 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Mareno
v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., 2000 WL 1401156 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Walker v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
Ill F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Ind. 2000); Chrissafis v. Cont'l Airlines, 1998 WL 100307 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
132. United States v. Filler, 210 F.3d 386 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d
595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that because credibility is an issue for the jury, psychiatric experts
may not testify specifically as to credibility or buttress credibility improperly)); United States v.
Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding exclusion of expert psychiatric testimony
that codefendant suffered from mental illness that caused him to lie).
133. 86 F. Supp. 2d 812 (N.D. 111. 2000).
134. Id. at 814.
135. Id. at 815.
136. Id. at 816.
137. Id. at 817.
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suggesting a causal link between bipolar disorder and a person's propensity
to fabricate. 138 The expert's testimony was therefore excluded.'39
It should be noted, however, that the rule against collateral impeachment
via an expert witness has an important exception. When a party makes a
successful proffer of expert testimony under Daubert (regardless of the field
of expertise), the opposing party may always seek to collaterally impeach
the expert witness by offering an expert of their own who might take issue
with the soundness of the methodologies used or the conclusions reached by
the original expert.140
F. Memory (N=14)
Of the fourteen cases using a Daubert analysis in dealing with the issue
of memory, one dealt with the effect of drugs on memory, 141 two dealt with
the resurfacing of repressed memories, 142 and eleven dealt with eyewitness
identification reliability.
In United States v. Saya143 the defendant, in an effort to discredit the
chief prosecution witness against him, offered an expert "to testify
'concerning the effects of prolonged and active polysubstance by"' that
witness. 44 Specifically, the expert would have testified how the drug use
would have affected the witness' "ability to remember, relate, and
distinguish historical events."'' 45 The court excluded the testimony because
its basis was methodologically unsound. 46 The expert had not examined the
witness nor conducted any tests of the witness' memory. Instead, the expert
based his opinion on an affidavit containing hearsay accounts of the witness'
drug use by four other unknown "witnesses.' 47 Even the expert himself
conceded that his methodology was "unendorsed by any scientific survey,
literature or publication."
'148
Both of the repressed memory cases admitted the testimony of qualified
experts so they were able to testify about the phenomenon of repressed
memories surfacing during therapy. The theory of resurfaced repressed
138. Id. at 818.
139. Id.
140. Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., 1995 WL 557473 (N.D. 111. 1995).
141. United States v. Saya, 961 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Haw. 1996).
142. Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1995); Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass.
1996).
143. United States v. Saya, 961 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Haw. 1996).
144. Id. at 1395.
145. Id. at 1395-96.
146. Id. at 1396.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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memories was held to be "well-recognized" and satisfied the Daubert
criteria for reliability. 1
49
An analysis of the group of cases dealing with reliability issues in
eyewitness identifications yielded some interesting inconsistencies. Nine of
the eleven cases (81.8%) excluded expert testimony regarding the reliability
of eyewitness identification for reasons such as the testimony would not
assist the trier of fact, 50 it would be misleading to the jury,' 5' or cross-
examination of the eyewitness in conjunction with jury instructions would
cover the topics of the proffered testimony. 152 For example, in United States
v. Smith,' the defendant was convicted of stealing guns from a gun shop.
Several lay witnesses testified they saw the defendant running out of the
store with the guns. At trial, the defendant offered expert testimony
regarding eyewitness reliability. The expert would have explained the
"circumstances that give rise to inaccurate memories,"'5 4 as well as the
phenomenon of an eyewitness' false confidence in the identification of a
suspect. 55 Both the district and appellate courts agreed the proffered expert
testimony was properly excluded.' 56 The circuit court explained that "in the
instant case, the proffered testimony touches 'on areas of common
knowledge.' Thus, .. . the testimony would not assist the trier of fact."' 5 7
In contrast, however, there appears to be some judges who understand
the psychological research concerning the unreliability of eyewitness
identifications and the associated false confidence that eyewitnesses can
have in mistaken identifications. They recognize that these phenomena are
149. Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1996). The other case, Hoult v. Hoult, 57
F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1995), did not undertake a comprehensive analysis of the underlying Daubert issue
since the defendant had not made an objection to the testimony of the prosecution's expert at trial,
thereby having waived the objection).
150. United States v. Crotteau, 218 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Walton,
122 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355 (11 th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995); United
States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994).
151. United States v. Walton, 1997 WL 525179 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d
1355 (1I1th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Burrous,
934 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995); United States
v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994).
152. United States v. Crotteau, 218 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Walton, 122 F.3d
1075 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994).
153. 156 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1998).
154. Id. at 1052.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1053.
157. Id.
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not within the common knowledge of jurors, and therefore permit experts to
address these issues at trial.158 The following excerpt from United States v.
Hines'59 illustrates that some judges can make appropriate rulings when they
understand the purpose of expert testimony in eyewitness identification
cases:
While jurors may well be confident that they can draw the
appropriate inferences about eyewitness identification directly from
their life experiences, their confidence may be misplaced, especially
where cross-racial identification is concerned .... Nor do I agree
that this testimony somehow usurps the function of the jury. The
function of the expert here is not to say to the jury - "you should
believe or not believe the eyewitness." . . . All that the expert does
is provide the jury with more information with which the jury can
then make a more informed decision. 6°
G. Job Placement/Discrimination/Harassment (N=6)
Six cases in this sample address the testimony of psychologists
regarding alleged discrimination or harassment in the workforce. Testimony
by these experts includes commentary on subjects including hiring
techniques, tests involved in assigning promotions, and stereotypes.' 6' In
general, as long as an expert can establish that the theories underlying
his/her testimony have been tested in the laboratory and the field, subjected
to peer review, published in reputable scientific journals, and generally
accepted by experts in the field of psychology, then testimony of this nature
is welcomed by the courts. 62 However, experts are generally not permitted
to opine that a plaintiff was, in fact, subject to or not subject to
harassment. 63
The case of Bryant v. City of Chicago164 is an example of how courts
appear to be uniformly applying Daubert to claims of discrimination in the
workplace. Bryant involved forty-four present or former sergeants of the
Chicago Police Department of African-American or Latino descent. 65 They
had alleged they were not promoted to lieutenant after taking the 1994 police
158. See United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Norwood,
939 F. Supp. 1132 (D.N.J. 1996).
159. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
160. Id. at 72.
161. See, e.g., Flavel v. Svedala Indus., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
162. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
163. Voisine v. Danzig, 1999 WL 33117132 (D. Me. 1999).
164. 200 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 2000).
165. Id. at 1094.
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lieutenant examination as a result of racial bias in the test, resulting in
deprivation of equal employment opportunities in the police force. 166 The
City retained Dr. Barrett, the psychologist who developed and administered
the examination being challenged. 167 Plaintiffs argued that Dr. Barrett's
testimony was inadmissible under Daubert because his contention that the
exam was "content valid and.. . could be used for rank-order promotions
[was] nothing more than inadmissible conjecture... [that] ... lack[ed]
'scientific validity."",168 The court, however, sided with the City of Chicago,
finding that Dr. Barrett was a well-qualified expert who had authored
approximately fifty articles dealing with employee selection and promotion
testing which were published in peer-reviewed journals. 169 More important,
the court found Dr. Barrett's opinions were formulated using data detailing
the relationship between the skills measured in the examination and an
individual's effectiveness as a lieutenant. 70 Accordingly, he was permitted
to testify.
In contrast, Collier v. Bradley University17 1 illustrates the barring of
expert testimony when the Daubert criteria for admissibility are not
satisfied. In this discrimination case, the plaintiff was an African-American
who had been given a terminal contract for employment as an assistant
professor at Bradley University. 172 She retained a social psychologist as an
expert witness to testify that she had been the victim of discrimination.
73
The defense claimed the methodology used to arrive at this conclusion was
flawed because it was based solely upon a content analysis of selected
documents and interviews with the plaintiff and her attorney. 74  They
argued that the expert should have interviewed other people, performed
other tests, and made independent attempts to verify the data that had been
provided to the expert by the plaintiffs attorney. 75 The court, however,
noted that "[w]hatever merit there may be to content analysis being a
recognized methodology in the field of social psychology, it is far from clear
that Dr. Wilson even knows what methodology she applied in this case to
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1096.
168. Id. at 1096.
169. Id. at 1098.
170. Id.
171. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (C.D. II1. 2000).
172. Id. at 1237.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1244.
175. Id.
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reach her conclusions." 176 The court went on to assume the validity of
content analysis, but still found fault with the way in which the expert
conducted the analysis because in comparing the depositions of the relevant
parties, she assumed that "90 percent of what most people say is true and 10
percent is self-serving.' 77  The court had no problem dismissing this
assumption as unsupported conjecture.
[T]he problem in this case is there is no indication in the record that
the 90%/10% gestalt methodology is even accepted among social
psychologists as an appropriate methodology. There is absolutely no
support, medical or otherwise, for her conclusion that people are
truthful 90% of the time and self-serving the other 10%. Absent
some type of support among social scientists or some other reliable
sources for her unique assumption, the Court finds that the
methodology employed by Dr. Wilson is fundamentally flawed.
Moreover, even if the 90%/10% were an acceptable methodology,
one would reasonably expect, and furthermore demand, that Dr.
Wilson be able to articulate what she credited and discredited in her
gestalt approach. Absent Dr. Wilson being able to articulate what
testimony she disregarded as "self-serving," her conclusions are
impossible to test on cross-examination by Defendants. 178
The case of Olsen v. Marriott International, Inc.179 also illustrates how
courts are strictly applying Daubert in job discrimination cases. The
plaintiff alleged he had been denied a position as a massage therapist
because he was male. 8° The defense argued "being female is a bona fide
occupational qualification for the percentage of massage therapists necessary
to satisfy customer requests for female therapists."' 8' The defense wanted to
call an expert who would have testified that massage therapy can trigger
memories of past sexual abuse, so, to avoid uncomfortable memories of past
victimization, clients should be permitted to choose the gender of their
massage therapist. 182 The court recognized the expert was qualified in the
areas of sexual abuse and gender, but disagreed that the proffered testimony
was within her realm of expertise since she lacked knowledge regarding the
psychological effects of massage.183 More importantly, though, the court
was concerned with the fact that the expert provided no reliable basis for an
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1245.
178. Id. at 1246.
179. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999).
180. Id. at 1056.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1057.
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opinion that "gender plays a part in triggering kinesthetic memories through
touch.... 184 Without establishing this link via reliable methods, the
expert's testimony was deemed to fail the Daubert test for admissibility.
H. Mental Disorders (N=15)
A large proportion of cases in the research sample (20.6%) concemed
expert testimony regarding mental disorders. In general, so long as the
expert is qualified and the methodologies used comport with generally
accepted behavioral science techniques, then courts welcome the opportunity
to have insights shared regarding most mental disorders. 18 5 Although four
cases in the research sample did not discuss the particular mental disorder at
issue in the case, 8 6 most of the remaining cases fell into three distinct
subgroups. We will address each of these in turn. Before doing so,
however, it should be noted that one case in the research sample prohibited
testimony on the existence of "factitious disorder" or "Munchausen
syndrome." The court simply said it had conducted a lengthy Daubert
hearing on the matter and concluded this psychiatric diagnosis did not meet
the reliability criteria of Daubert.'87  It did not, however, offer any
explanation for its rationale in arriving at this conclusion.
1. Compulsive Gambling Disorder
Four of the mental disorder cases concerned parties diagnosed with
compulsive gambling disorder. Although the testimony of psychologists or
psychiatrists was unanimously admitted in these cases, the scope of the
expert's testimony was always limited to the diagnosis of the relevant party
as a compulsive or pathological gambler. 188  None of the experts was
permitted to go beyond the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria to discuss a
184. Id. at 1058.
185. See United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000) (allowing testimony predicting
future dangerousness of defendant based on his score on the Hass Psychopathy Checklist Revised
over defendant's objections to the test's reliability since defendants only challenged the Psychopathy
Checklist with two articles written by his own expert, and no other evidence of unreliability); Sims
v. Med. Ctr of Baton Rouge, Inc., 1997 WL 527330 (E.D. La. 1997) (holding a claim of
misdiagnosis under the DSM-IV does not render the opinion inadmissible, but rather is something
that can be challenged on cross-examination).
186. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Martinez, 1999 WL 33290665
(W.D. Tex. 1999); Sims, 1997 WL 527330 (E.D. La. 1997); Goomar v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 855
F. Supp. 319, 326 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
187. United States v. Martinez, 1999 WL 33290665 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
188. United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Scholl, 959 F. Supp.
1189 (D. Ariz. 1997); United States v. Libutti, 1994 WL 774646 (D.N.J. 1994).
"pathological gambling lifestyle." For example, in United States v.
Scholl,189 the defendant was charged with several counts of tax evasion
based on his gambling earnings and losses.1 90 The district court allowed his
expert to testify that he was a compulsive gambler. But, the expert was not
permitted to testify that "pathological gamblers have distortions in thinking
and 'denial,' which impact their ability and emotional wherewithal to keep
records" since doing so would "force them to confront the reality of losses,
which creates too much upheaval."' 9' The court, in upholding the exclusion
of this testimony on appeal, made it clear that "there was no support in the
literature for this opinion or for the idea that pathological gamblers cannot
truthfully report gambling income."'
192
2. Learning Disabilities
As with the compulsive gambling cases, courts are very open to
receiving testimony regarding the presence of learning disabilities. The
proffered expert need not, per se, be an expert in learning disabilities. For
example, in Lanni v. New Jersey,193 a physician with board certifications in
psychiatry, neurology, and forensic psychiatry was permitted to testify that
he did not believe the plaintiff suffered from dyslexia or any other
neurological disorder, even though the expert did not specialize in learning
disabilities. 94 "Dr. Welner need not be the best qualified expert in order to
proffer an opinion about [p]laintiff s learning disabilities .... [He] is an
expert in forensic psychiatry and is qualified to proffer an opinion about
[p]laintiff's learning disabilities and mental condition."'195 Moreover, courts
appear eager to learn about a person's learning disabilities, even if the expert
did not strictly adhere to DSM-IV criteria in arriving at their diagnosis. In
Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison Co.,196 a qualified psychologist had
conducted a detailed examination of a person found to have "attention deficit
disorder and [a] learning disability (mixed type affecting both language and
the perceptual domain).' 97 According to the expert herself, she did not rely
on the DSM-IV because "although the DSM is widely respected in the field
of psychological disorders, it is not the 'bible' for determining learning
disability."'98 Instead, she relied on a book by Jerome M. Sattler entitled
189. 166 F.3d. 964 (9th Cir. 1999).
190. Id. at 968-69.
191. Id. at 970.
192. Jd. at 971.
193. 177 F.R.D. 295 (D.N.J. 1998).
194. Id. at 298.
195. Id. at 302-03.
196. 967 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
197. Id. at 1454.
198. Id. at 1454-55.
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Assessment of Children's Intelligence and Special Abilities'99 that she
considered to be the "'definitive text' for diagnosing learning disabilities in
children. '200  That book states that "[i]n the final analysis, clinical and
psycho-educational considerations must come together in a diagnosis of
learning disability." 20 1 Since the expert's conclusions were based on her
clinical and psycho-educational judgment - a "gray area" in the science of
learning disabilities according to the court - she was permitted to testify.20 2
The fact that her diagnosis was not in accordance with the DSM-IV was
something that could be attacked on cross-examination, but would not bar
her opinion from being admitted into evidence.2 3
3. Personality Disorders
Courts have a long history of being hostile to Axis II personality
disorders.2°4 But, it appears courts are at least willing to admit testimony of
mental health professionals who have examined a patient and found that
patient to be suffering from a personality disorder under circumstances
where the clinician is seeking to opine on the current and future psychiatric
treatment of the patient. Because this testimony is based on clinical research
as well as professional experience with a specific patient, testimony is
generally admitted.20 5 There are certain instances, however, where clinicians
are not permitted to testify.
In United States v. Marsh,0 6 the defendant had been convicted of
attempted extortion for trying to get money from a businessman with whom
he had been having a homosexual relationship for nearly twenty-five years
that had, at least in the beginning, started out with acts of prostitution.2 7 At
trial, the defendant wanted an expert to testify that the alleged victim was
suffering from dependant personality disorder and, as a result, the victim
was not scared into making monetary payments to the defendant, but rather
199. JEROME M. SATTLER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN'S INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL ABILITIES
(2d ed. 1988).
200. Mancuso, 967 F. Supp. at 1455.
201. Id. (citing Sattler, supra note 199, at 400).
202. Id. at 1456.
203. Id.
204. E.g., Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking The Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 639 (1990).
205. See, e.g., Doe v. Tag, Inc., 1993 WL 484212 (N.D. 111. 1993).
206. 26 F.3d 1496 (9th Cir. 1994).
207. Id. at 1498.
did so voluntarily in order to keep the defendant in his life.2 °8 The district
court excluded the testimony as irrelevant since the victim's state of mind in
an extortion or attempted extortion case is not an element of the crime.20 9
The appeals court upheld this decision.210 The dissent argued that if the
expert testimony had been admitted, the voluntary nature of the relationship
would have been better understood by the jury, allowing it to have
interpreted the defendant's words "not as extortion but as,... an exchange
'in which both members were getting something out of the relationship.'
211
The dissent, citing several psychological studies, went on to explain that the
testimony of the expert would have helped the jury understand the
defendant's state of mind insofar as his taunts "played to a side of [the
alleged victim] that welcomed such treatment and in no way feared or
resented it ... .,,212 It is unclear whether the majority of the court did not
understand the relevance of the expert testimony, or whether it simply
disregarded it, because the majority opinion made no attempt to counter the
argument of the dissenting judge.2 13
When evaluating the cases in this category, a clear limitation on the
admissibility of expert testimony with regard to the existence of mental
disorders emerged. Retrospective expert testimony regarding the existence
or onset of a mental illness is generally "inadmissible speculation" under
Daubert.214 Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Fleischer215 illustrates
this limitation. The plaintiff in Fleischer filed suit against his insurance
company for failing to pay disability benefits to him. 216 In support of his
claim, he offered the testimony of an expert who, after a three-hour long
examination of the plaintiff, concluded he had been suffering from bipolar
disorder for at least twelve years and that it would have rendered the plaintiff
totally disabled by 1994, a critical date under the facts of the case.2 17 The
court excluded the testimony of the expert following the general rule that
"retrospective expert testimony regarding the existence or onset of a mental
illness is inadmissible speculation.' 2 8 Specifically, the court found that the
expert's report was of "no value in assisting the court to determine the cause
or onset of Fleischer's mental disability that occurred four years earlier.,
219
208. Id. at 1500.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1503.
211. Id. at 1507.
212. Id. at 1508.
213. Id. at 1504.
214. Goomar v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 319, 326 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
215. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1221-22.
218. Id. at 1226 n.5 (citing Goomar, 855 F. Supp. at 326).
219. Id.
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This was especially the case since the plaintiffs own two treating physicians
during the relevant time frame had diagnosed him with depression.22 °
Another limitation that emerged from the research sample on the
admissibility of expert testimony regarding mental disorders concerned the
area of expertise of the proffered expert. Courts have applied Daubert
inconsistently on this question. As discussed earlier in the learning
disabilities section, Lanni v. New Jersey,22' permitted a psychiatrist to give
his opinion that a party did not suffer from a learning disability even though
he lacked specialized skills and experience in the appropriate sub-areas of
his discipline dealing with learning disabilities. 222 But when someone seeks
to do so with regard to a mental disorder, courts are much less lenient.
In Smith v. Rasmussen,223 the plaintiff had been diagnosed with a gender
identity disorder.224 He sued to have Medicaid pay for the final stage of his
sex reassignment therapy, the actual sex change operation.225 In its attempt
to prove that sex change operations were "experimental," and therefore not
covered by Medicaid, the government wanted to call a psychiatrist to testify
that sex reassignment is "'controversial,' and more specifically, 'poorly
evolved, less than perfected, certainly not [a] curative procedure.', 226 The
psychiatrist also would have testified that he "opposed surgical treatment of
psychiatric disorders and that he believes psychotherapy is a more
appropriate treatment in all cases of gender identity disorder., 227 But the
government's expert had no first-hand knowledge of gender identity
disorder, his opinion was based strictly on a literature review.228 The court
did not allow the expert to testify, reasoning the lack of first hand knowledge
with the specific disorder rendered the expert's opinion unreliable.229
Moreover, the court stated that the specific expertise in dealing with gender
identity disorder could not be removed by his review of the literature since a
literature review "is an insufficient basis or methodology on which to render
a reliable expert opinion.
' 230
220. Id. at 1226.
221. 177 F.R.D. 295 (D.N.J. 1998).
222. Id. at 296.
223. 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
224. Id. at 740.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 764.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 766.
229. Id. at 764-69.
230. Id. at 766.
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I. Sexual Predators (N=3)
Defendants charged with acts of child molestation sometimes seek to
offer the testimony of experts to testify that they do not fit the common
characteristics of fixated pedophiles and/or child molesters. When faced
with situations like this, courts pay lip service to Daubert, but ultimately
seem to resort to the Frye test. United States v. Robinson2 31 is a typical case.
The defendant was accused of having engaged in sexual contact with two
females under the age of twelve.2 32 A defense expert, after having evaluated
the defendant using, among other tests, the "Abel Assessment for Sexual
Interest," opined the defendant did not have a sexual interest in underage
females.233 Even though the Abel test was a relatively recent creation at the
time of the trial, the court ruled that it had been sufficiently tested to
establish its validity and reliability, the results had been subjected to the peer
review publications process, its potential error rate was not too high, and it
was generally accepted in the scientific community.234 Accordingly, the
expert was permitted to testify.
235
Not all tests, however, have achieved general acceptance in the
psychological community via a demonstration of their reliability and
validity. In United States v. Powers,236 the court refused to admit the results
of a penile plethysmograph test, a test which measures arousal by testing the
response of the penis to being shown pictures of nude females of various age
groups.237
First, the Government proffered evidence that the scientific
literature addressing penile plethysmography does not regard the
test as a valid diagnostic tool because, although useful for treatment
of sex offenders, it has no accepted standards in the scientific
community. Second, the Government also introduced evidence
before the judge that a vast majority of incest offenders who do not
admit their guilt, such as [the defendant], show a normal reaction to
the test. The Government argues that such false negatives render the
test unreliable.238
The Powers court also upheld the district court's exclusion of a
psychologist from testifying that the defendant did not demonstrate the
231. 94 F. Supp. 2d 751 (W.D. La. 2000).
232. Id. at 752.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 752-54.
235. Id. at 755.
236. 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995).
237. Id. at 1471.
238. Id.
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psychological profile of fixated pedophile. 239 The district court had ruled the
defendant had not established the scientific reliability of psychological
profiling.240 The appeals court, however, did not address that issue.
241
Instead, the court ruled that any such evidence was not relevant since, even
if admitted, the testimony would have only shown that the defendant, unlike
forty percent of incest perpetrators, did not exhibit the characteristics of a
fixed pedophile.242 But the defendant was not charged with being a fixed
pedophile, but rather with the statutory rape of his daughter.2 43 He "offered
no evidence to link a non-proclivity for pedophilia with a non-proclivity for
incest abuse."244 Accordingly, the proffered expert testimony was deemed to
have been properly excluded on the grounds of relevancy.245
Finally in this category, it is worth noting that at least one court has
allowed expert testimony from a non-behavioral scientist on the issue of
sexual predators. In United States v. Romero,246 the prosecution offered the
testimony of an FBI agent "who had spent many years studying the sexual
exploitation of children and produced over 20 publications .... 247  The
agent was permitted to testify about the characteristics of a "preferential sex
offenders" - those having "a definite preference for sexual contact with
children and methodically pursue such contact. 248 Since the defendant had
lured his victim to him over the course of months in intemet chat rooms, the
appeals court upheld the decision of the trial court to admit the testimony on
the grounds that it
was critical in dispelling from the jurors' minds the widely held
stereotype of a child molester as 'a dirty old man in a wrinkled
raincoat' who snatches children off the street as they wait for the
school bus. Many real-life child molesters use modem technology
and sophisticated psychological techniques to 'seduce' their
victims.
249
239. Id. at 1471-72.
240. Id. at 1472.
241. Id. at 1472-73.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1472.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1473.
246. 189 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1999).
247. Id. at 582.
248. Id. at 583.
249. Id. at 584.
Because the agent's testimony helped the jury to understand the modus
operandi of a certain type of child molester, the court felt the testimony was
highly relevant. ° It is interesting to note, however, that the judicial opinion
in the Romero case was devoid of any analysis of the FBI agent's
methodologies. There was no inquiry into the validity and reliability of his
methods or his conclusions. It therefore appears that Daubert was not
correctly applied in this case.
J. Victimology (N = 6)
In cases in which the behavior of the alleged victim of a crime or tort is
of some relevance (e.g., claims of self-defense, consensual sex, non-
reporting of abuse, etc.), it is often helpful for the jury to have expert
testimony that explains the behavior of the victim. Such testimony by
experts on issues of victimology is generally admitted under certain
proscriptions.15 ' Experts are limited to explaining "behavior that would
otherwise appear unusual to the average juror, such as why a victim of
sexual abuse might not immediately report his or her abuse. 252 But experts
may not testify regarding their opinions whether an alleged victim was or
was not actually abused. For example, in Gier ex rel Gier v. Edue. Serv.
Unit No. 16,53 mentally and physically handicapped children underwent
psychological testing and evaluations to determine whether or not they had
been subjected to abuse.254 The plaintiffs wanted their experts to be able to
testify that the children they examined had, in fact, been abused. 5 The court
did not permit the experts to testify "to any conclusion that any plaintiff was
abused in any way," "to any opinion based on such a conclusion," or "to any
opinion that plaintiffs' behavior is consistent with abuse of any kind., 256
There was an anomalous case in this category which, at first, blush,
appears to be an excellent example of how expert testimony can be used to
explain the seemingly bizarre behavior of the victim of a crime. Upon
further scrutiny, however, some serious issues about the misapplication of
250. Id. at 585.
251. See United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Alzanki, 54
F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995); White v. Keane, 51 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Houser v. Lowe,
1996 WL 560232 (D. Kan. 1996).
252. White, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
253. 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995).
254. Id. at 942.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 942-43; see also White, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 501 (upholding admission of testimony that
was limited to describing victim behavior after abuse where expert made no assertions with regard to
her opinions on the victimization of the children in that particular case); cf Karibian v. Columbia
Univ., 930 F. Supp. 134, (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (disallowing testimony of clinical social worker who
would have attempted to explain why the plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit behaved as she did
when such testimony was offered to bolster the plaintiffs credibility).
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Daubert come to light. United States v. Bighead 57 involved a prosecution
of a father for the sexual abuse of his minor daughter. The victim testified
that she began to be sexually molested at the age of seven and that this abuse
continued until she was seventeen years old. When she was eighteen, she
finally notified the police. At trial, the cross-examination of the victim
centered around her delay in reporting the abuse, as well as some minor
inconsistencies in her testimony. In rebuttal, the prosecution called an
expert witness to testify not only about the general characteristics of child
sexual abuse victims, but also the issues concerning the timing of their
reporting the abuse and their recollection of abuse details. Her opinions
were based on having interviewed over 1300 victims of sexual abuse over
the course of years of clinical work.
On appeal, the defendant contended the admission of this testimony was
in error since the court made no determinations regarding the expert's
theories about "delayed disclosure" and "script memory," two phenomena
that would help the jury understand why the victim had not previously come
forward and why she had some inconsistencies in her testimony.
Specifically, the defendant argued the court should have inquired whether
the expert's theories could be tested, were subjected to peer review and
publication, had the potential for error, and were generally accepted in the
field. The court rebuffed those arguments, saying because the expert had
based her opinions upon her professional experience rather than on any
novel scientific or special technique or model, Daubert was not implicated.
The dissenting judge, however, took sharp issue with the majority's handling
of the case. First, he pointed out that the expert was neither a psychologist
nor a psychiatrist, but rather was a nurse with an interdisciplinary doctorate
in law, sociology, social work, psychology, and nursing. Second, the dissent
cited research conducted by a clinical professor of child psychiatry at the
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University regarding the
work of "experts" like the one offered by the prosecution in this case. That
research concluded there is a remarkable bias by people without professional
training and proper credentials as psychologists and psychiatrist towards
believing whatever stories the child victim tells them. Such "experts"
believe that children never lie, and they often interpret what is actually
normal as indicators of sexual abuse suffered by the children.258
The outcome in the Bighead case turned on the majority's belief that it
did not have to apply Daubert to testimony like the one offered by the
257. 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997).
258. Id. at 1338 (citing RICHARD A. GARDNER, SEX ABUSE HYSTERIA: SALEM WITCH TRIALS
REVISITED 46-65 (1991)).
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prosecution in the case. This may be due, in large part, to the fact that
Bighead was decided before the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear in Kumho
that Daubert applies to all expert testimony in March 1999. Presumably, the
case would be differently decided today. "Key-citing" the case in
Westlaw®, however, reveals no negative indirect history to the case.
K. Miscellaneous (N = 1)
One case in the research sample, Estate of Macias v. Lopez,259 presented
a rather unique fact pattern and was unable to be included in one of the ten
typology categories described above. This case was brought by the estate of
Ms. Macias for her wrongful death. She was shot and killed by her ex-
husband. The estate argued that her relationship with her husband escalated
to the point of his killing her due to the lack of law enforcement and judicial
intervention in the domestic violence issues occurring in their home. The
estate sought to introduce the testimony of a family counselor who
specialized in domestic violence and child abuse. He was prepared to testify
that the defendants acted wrongfully in handling the Macias case.
Moreover, he would have testified that the negligent conduct of the
authorities was a "substantial factor" in causing Maria Macias' death.260 The
basis for his having reached that opinion was his "expertise and experience"
with men like Avelino Macias. Specifically he asserted "it was reasonably
foreseeable from January 21, 1996 onward that if Avelino was permitted to
continue his pattern of harassment it would escalate to violence."'2 6' Finally,
the expert wanted to testify about studies demonstrating that aggressive law
enforcement intervention reduces domestic homicide rates.
The court determined the sections of the expert's testimony regarding
police procedure and the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention and
counseling would be admissible. However, the conclusions with regard to
the specifics of the case regarding the behavior of Avelino Macias were not
admitted because, according to the court, testimony regarding a direct link
between the defendants' acts and omissions and the death of Maria Macias
was pure speculation.
259. 42 F. Supp.2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
260. Id. at 970.
261. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. Specific Conclusions Regarding the Typology
Before drawing conclusions about Daubert's application to behavioral
science as a whole, there are some important findings that should be
emphasized within each category of the typology.
Testimony by psychologists and psychiatrists regarding false
confessions is generally accepted by the courts, but in two distinct ways.
First, testimony regarding empirical research into the phenomenon of false
confessions is permitted if the expert offers only generalized information.
They are permitted to testify that false confessions occur. They can also
explore the traits associated with those who may falsely testify. However,
such experts are not permitted to testify about anything specifically relating
to the defendant on trial, such as stating that the defendant's mental
impairments increase the likelihood of that individual falsely confessing. In
contrast, though, psychologists and psychiatrists who have performed a
clinical evaluation of the defendant are permitted to testify about the specific
likelihood of a false confession from a defendant based upon their evaluation
of the defendant, provided they have used generally accepted methods of
clinical assessment.
Expert testimony in the area of competency to stand trial is almost
always allowed, presumably because of the legal justifications surrounding
it. However, when the competency evaluation process is not properly
adhered to, or when the clinician assessing the defendant does not use tests
or methods generally accepted in a clinical field, expert testimony will likely
be excluded.
When experts testify in support of diminished capacity defenses
regarding a defendant's mens rea, they must have some specific insights into
the defendant's mental state that is directly related to the level of criminal
intent at issue in the case. Generalizations about how a particular mental
disorder may be highly correlated to specific personality traits that may or
may not have played a role in a particular defendant's case will not be
accepted.
Discrimination/job placement cases generally admit expert testimony if
two criteria are met. First, they must have used methods that are generally
accepted by experts in the field. Second, the expert may need to have
special expertise directly linked to the facts of the case.
As long as an expert is properly qualified and the methodologies used
are in accordance with generally accepted behavioral science techniques,
testimony regarding mental disorders is welcomed by the court. In regards
to compulsive gambling cases, testimony is admitted when dealing with the
diagnosis of an individual as a compulsive gambler, but testimony cannot
continue with discussion of the "pathological gambling lifestyle." Courts
are also very accepting of experts testifying about leaming disabilities.
Lastly, when an expert examines and treats an individual for a personality
disorder and wishes to comment on the current and future treatment of the
patient, testimony is usually admitted. However, experts are not permitted
to proffer retrospective testimony regarding the onset of a disorder.
A properly qualified expert may testify about the issue of emotional
distress as long as their methodology is sound. Such testimony may regard
the causes, types, and problems associated with emotional distress, but may
generally not address how the victim should be compensated for the
emotional distress. Of course, such testimony will be excluded, though, if
the methods used have not been established as reliable.
Expert testimony regarding the credibility of other witnesses is generally
excluded under Daubert. This is an issue for a jury to determine. However,
it should be noted that when one side offers expert testimony, the other side
may always try to impeach the credibility of that expert by offering expert
testimony of their own.
The general category of memory can be broken down into three sub-
categories. The first sub-category deals with the effects of drugs on a
person's ability to remember. Testimony has been denied regarding this
issue for reliability reasons. The second sub-category deals with the
phenomenon of repressed memory retrieval. This subject matter has been
generally accepted by the scientific community and is, therefore, generally
accepted under Daubert. The third sub-category regards the reliability of
eyewitness identification. Courts are split on whether testimony of this
subject matter should be permitted under Daubert. Some courts admit such
testimony, finding it would help the jury assess a defendant's claim of
innocence in spite of a positive eyewitness identification. Other courts
excluded such testimony finding it would not assist the jury, but rather
would mislead it, or, alternatively, that rigorous cross-examination of an
eyewitness in conjunction with appropriate jury instructions would be
sufficient.
Expert testimony about the general characteristics sexual predators is
also generally accepted under Daubert. This testimony is often
supplemented with a conclusion that a defendant does or does not exhibit the
same characteristics of such predators. When courts determine whether or
not to admit such testimony, the standards of Frye are usually relied on
insofar as the courts seem to hinge their decisions on whether the testimony
is based on methods accepted by the relevant scientific community.
Testimony is also offered in regards to the general characteristics of
certain types of victims - particularly those of sexual abuse. Such testimony
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is generally accepted under Daubertas long as the expert does not opine that
victimization did or did not occur in a particular case.
B. Generalized Conclusions
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this study. First,
although critics of Daubert have suggested that having judges evaluating
scientific methodologies would lead to inconsistent results, it appears that
inconsistencies are the exceptions, rather than the rule. Daubert was
uniformly applied in the vast majority of the categories within the typology.
For example, courts have taken a uniform approach in ruling that a literature
review is an insufficient basis, standing alone, to allow an expert to proffer
an opinion based on his or her review of the relevant literature. 62 Similarly,
testimony with regard to hedonic damages is uniformly excluded as
unreliable. 63 Such consistency in outcomes was found in each of the ten
major subtypes of cases identified in the typology presented by this research
with only two notable exceptions.
Courts are split with regard to whether an expert needs to have specific
expertise on the relevant issue in order to testify about that issue. Some
courts allow a qualified behavioral scientist to render an opinion on an issue
of behavioral science in general, even if the expertise of the proffered
witness is in a different sub-field than the one in which they seek to testify.
In contrast, other courts require experts to have specialized expertise in the
relevant sub-field.
A second major inconsistency has to do with the ways in which courts
deal with the issue of the reliability of eyewitness testimony. While no
courts dismiss the empirical research on mistaken identifications on
methodological grounds, some refuse to admit evidence regarding this
phenomenon. The two reasons most frequently cited for rejecting expert
testimony in this realm are that courts mistakenly believe jurors are aware of
the problems with eyewitness identification, or that they believe testimony
will not be helpful to the jury in its deliberations.
Finally, although courts pay lip service to Daubert, it appears the Frye
test is alive and well. Cases in which methods and/or conclusions were
being offered that conformed to those that are "generally accepted in the
262. See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906, 912 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Burton v. Danek Med.,
Inc., 1999 WL 118020, *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 1999); Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.,
967 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 372-73
(D.N.J. 1995); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1476 (D.V.I.), aff'd
without op., 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).
263. See sources supra at note 87.
relevant scientific community" are the ones in which testimony is deemed
admissible. In contrast, when an expert varies from that which is generally
accepted, courts are quick to exclude the testimony citing the very same
factors that were relevant under Frye, with peer-reviewed publication being
one of the most important factors.
There appears to be only one area in which Daubert is not being
rigorously applied to behavioral science testimony. Courts are highly
deferential to the "expert opinions" offered by law enforcement officers
based on their years of experience in the field when they offer opinions with
regard to modus operandi or other aspects of "the working of the criminal
mind."264 Explorations into their theoretical knowledge base, as well as the
validity and reliability of both their methodologies and their conclusions,
appear to have escaped Daubert review.265
In light of cases analyzed in this study, and the conclusions drawn
therefrom, judges are applying Daubert vigorously when experts seek to
offer opinions based on methodologies that are not generally accepted. With
the few exceptions noted above (i.e., whether sub-specialization should be
required as a prerequisite to admit expert testimony; whether testimony with
regard to the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony should be admitted; and the
ostensibly overbroad latitude granted to law enforcement officers when they
testify as experts), it appears to be that the driving force behind Daubert -
the exclusion of evidence lacking scientific validity and reliability - is being
met.
264. Clifford Britt, Getting Your Security Expert over the Daubert Hurdle, 37 TRIAL 31, 36
(2001); Marc C. Garber, Opening Daubert's Gate: Testing the Reliability of an Expert's Experiences
After Kumho, 15 JUDICATURE 4 (2000).
265. Compare United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1999), Kerlec v. E-Z Serve
Convenience Stores, Inc., 1998 WL 637244 (E.D. La. 1998), and Warmack & Co. v. Beltz, 2000
WL 1299553 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000), with Shah v. Pan American World Services, 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir.
1998).
